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ABSTRACT 
The present study contributes to identifying obstacles to the development of a local biodiesel agro-industrial 
system (AGS) in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil. The research questions are: “How do local social characteristics 
influence the organizational effectiveness of agents involved in the joint production effort?”; and “How can the 
institutional arrangement of biodiesel production be described?” The method adopted is the case study, focused on 
family farmers served by the Family Farmers Rural Extension and Technical Assistance Company (EMATER). This 
state organization introduced castor beans (Ricinus communis L.) to family farmers as an alternative crop to supply 
a processing plant (Darcy Ribeiro Biodiesel Plant—DRBP) in northern Minas Gerais state, Brazil. These family 
farmers are not horizontally organized, and sign individual contracts with DRBP. The paper concludes that the 
primary obstacle to developing the biodiesel AGS with castor beans in Minas Gerais is the lack of horizontal 
organization among family farmers.  
Keywords: Biodiesel production system; Agro-industrial System (AGS); Institutional Arrangement; Castor bean; 
Minas Gerais, Brazil; Family Farmers 
JEL: D23; O13; Q163  
 
 
1 Introduction: A model induced by regulation 
Governmental policies aimed at promoting development in rural areas are usually directed at introducing 
new agro-based production systems. This is the case with biodiesel production in Brazil, which tries to 
engage family farmers through a governmental regional development program. Since this intervention is 
not an exception, and both successes and failures have been observed, the present study aims to identify 
the obstacles to the development of biodiesel AGS in traditional rural communities. 
The regulation of biodiesel in Brazil is based on a Federal Law* that introduced biodiesel into the Brazilian 
energy matrix and authorized its voluntary addition to diesel petrol starting in 2005. In 2008 the biodiesel 
mix became mandatory, and its proportion in the blend offered on the market is 5% as of 2010. The 
National Program for the Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB)† was established in order to originate a 
sustainable chain of biodiesel production and use. It has since incorporated a number of new features so 
as to become sustainable and enhance family farmers’ income. Just as important to the program’s agenda 
as the environmental aspect are family farmers’ inclusion and local development mechanisms. The 
program aims to promote the production of non-traditional oil crops in regions with chronic development 
                                                 
* Federal Law nº 11,097/05, approved by the National Congress on January 13th,  2005.  
† PNPB is the acronym of Programa Nacional de Produção e Uso do Biodiesel. The PNPB was created in December 2004 in order to 
implement a sustainable form—in techniques and economics—of production and use of biodiesel. 
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problems. At the same time, it sets goals through the mandatory inclusion of biodiesel into the energy 
matrix.  
The inclusion of family farmers in the biodiesel production system is not a spontaneous event. The main 
incentive to facilitate family farmers’ inclusion in this system is the “Social Fuel Seal” promoted by the 
Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA).‡ This certification enables the biodiesel industry to obtain tax 
benefits and participate in the auctions organized by Brazil’s National Petrol Agency (ANP);§ however, 
they must agree to purchase a minimum percentage of feedstock from family farmers in order to 
participate in the program**. On the other hand, family farmers receive incentives from the biodiesel 
industry—such as technical assistance, supply of seeds, and crop transportation—to participate in the 
biodiesel production system. Although there are regulatory incentives, local social characteristics play an 
important role in the institutional arrangement of biodiesel production. This study addresses the 
following questions: (i) How do local social characteristics influence the organizational effectiveness of 
agents involved in the joint production effort? (ii) How can the institutional arrangement of biodiesel 
production be described?  
This study analyses the introduction of the biodiesel agro-system as an alternative for farmers based on 
organizational elements, by examining the institutional arrangement of biodiesel production involving 
family farmers, considering the initial operation in a region with no previous history of biodiesel 
production. In this study we adopt the concept of an institutional structure of production that explains 
the manner of organizing the transactions. The concept is based on Coase (1992) and Williamson (1996). 
The local social characteristics, such as culture and tradition, are taken into account in order to explain 
how they influence the start-up phase of local biodiesel production.  
The Agro-industrial System (AGS) approach is adopted as an analysis tool to be applied to the biodiesel 
system. The AGS is analyzed under a systemic view and evaluates the relationships among the agents, also 
considering the importance of the institutional and organizational environments to provide support to 
production activities. Furthermore, the AGS dynamic is affected by changes in the institutional 
environment, seen as formal and informal rules that restrict the agents’ action. To understand how the 
biodiesel chain’s agents organize their production system, one has to consider the influence of local 
institutions, besides the formal ones. A Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach is applied, since the 
transaction is the basic unit of analysis (Williamson 1985).  
The present paper is organized in six parts. Following the introduction, Part 2 presents an overview of the 
biodiesel AGS in the state of Minas Gerais and the castor bean family farmers’ transactions. Part 3 
describes the theoretical framework. Part 4 presents the methodology applied in this study. Part 5 points 
out the key elements related to the development of new agro supply chains in the case of the biodiesel 
AGS in the state of Minas Gerais. Part 6 concludes and outlines the key obstacles that characterized the 
start-up operation of the biodiesel chain.  
2 The castor bean based on biodiesel AGS 
The National Program for the Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB) was established at the national level 
in 2005, but local institutions should be considered, as the effectiveness of the program might differ from 
region to region. According to Ostrom (2008a), for large countries, rules that are appropriate in one 
region are rarely effective in another.  
  
The biodiesel project in Minas Gerais has been developed since 2003 as a local development program 
coordinated by the state’s Secretariat of Science, Technology and Higher Education (SECTES).†† Although 
the local government had begun an initiative to develop biodiesel prior to 2005, significant production 
impacts were not observed until 2009, when a new Petrobras processing plant, the Darcy Ribeiro 
Biodiesel Plant (DRBP), commenced operation in Montes Claros municipality. Table 1 shows that the 
production of biodiesel differs among regions. The main Brazilian biodiesel production regions are Rio 
                                                 
‡ MDA is the acronym of Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário. In 2004, the MDA started establishing the regulation of the “Social Fuel 
Seal”.  
§ ANP is the acronym of Brazil’s Agência Nacional do Petróleo, which regulates the biodiesel market and approves biodiesel companies’ 
operation and biodiesel marketing.   
** The minimum percentage of feedstock purchased from recognized family farmers to be eligible for the Social Fuel Seal is as follows: 
North and Mid-west: 15%; South-east, North-east, and Semi-arid: 30%; South: 35% (harvest of 2012/2013) and 40% (harvest of 
2013/2014). (MDA, 2012) 
†† SECTES is the acronym for Secretaria de Estado de Ciência, Tecnologia e Ensino Superior. 
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Grande do Sul, Mato Grosso, and Goiás, due to the large regional specialization in soybean production, 
the main feedstock for biodiesel.  
Around the world, biodiesel has been mainly produced from edible vegetable oils, such as soybean, 
coconut, and palm, and thus may compete with food supply in the long-term (Encinar et.al., 2012). 
However, the PNPB promoted the diversification of feedstock away from the soybean and the 
development of the Brazilian northeastern and semi-arid regions (Brazil, 2005). The semi-arid regions 
comprise 11 Brazilian states, nine in the Northeast and two in the Southeast (Espírito Santo and Minas 
Gerais). In particular, production in Minas Gerais was insignificant in 2005, and its increase by 2009 was 
due to the launch of DRBP (table 1). 
 
Table 1. 
Biodiesel Production – B100 – in cubic meters 
 
State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  
Bahia - 4,238.135 70,941.993 65,982.132 79,940.850 
Ceará - 1,956.2 47,276.165 19,207.526 49,153.503 
Goiás - 10,107.972 110,638.065 241,364.097 268,701.549 
Maranhão - - 23,508.648 36,172.289 31,194.889 
Mato 
Grosso 




- - - - 4,367.208 
Minas 
Gerais 
43.82 310.5 138.164 - 40,271.182 
Pará 510.4 2,420.9 3,716.76 2,625.248 3,494.354 
Paraná 25.57 99,5 12.1 7,294.371 23,681.277 
Piauí 156.369 28,603.529 30,473.645 4,547.574 3,615,902 
Rio Grande 
do Sul 
- - 42,696.398 306,056.041 454,189.287 
Rio de 
Janeiro 
- - - - 8,201.079 
Rondônia - - 99.175 227.646 4,779.355 
São Paulo - 21,251.395 36,885.267 185,594.154 236,302.001 
Tocantins - - 22,772.705 13,134.566 33,547.442 
Brazil 736.159 69,001.981 404,329.14 1,167,128.415 1,610,457.417 
         Source: ANP 2012 
 
The introduction of the DRBP biodiesel plant in Montes Claros, with a production of 108 million liters per 
year, is intended to function as an alternative source of income for farmers in the northern region of 
Minas Gerais. This state has the second-highest number of family farmers among Brazilian states, 
amounting to 437,415 individuals occupying a total area of 8,845,883 ha (IBGE, 2006). The concept of the 
family farmer is defined in Federal Law n° 11326, July 24th, 2006, article 3: a family farmer is a person 
engaged in farm activities in an area no larger than 4 modules;‡‡ the farm activities are predominantly 
performed by family members; the family income predominantly results from activities linked to the farm; 
and the farm activities are managed by family. Because the National Program for the Production and Use 
of Biodiesel (PNPB) focuses on family farmers and the diversification of biodiesel feedstock, DRBP took 
into account a new attempt to motivate family farmers to cultivate castor bean in the north of Minas 
Gerais. Moreover, DRBP must purchase feedstock from family farmers in order to receive the Social Fuel 
Seal.  
The role of the Social Fuel Seal is to promote the social inclusion and diversification of the regions 
producing biodiesel. This certification is awarded to biodiesel companies that meet the following 
                                                 
‡‡ The tax module is measured in hectares and differs in each region as follows: North: 5 to 100 ha; Northeast: 5 to 90 ha; Southeast: 5 to 
70 ha; South: 5 to 40 ha; and Mid-West: 5 to 110 ha. In the state of Minas Gerais, located in the Southeast region, the minimum size of one 
tax module is 5 ha and the maximum is 70 ha (IBGE, 2006). Hence, the size of a family farm in Minas Gerais ranges from 5 ha to 280 ha. 
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requirements: (a) acquire a minimum percentage of feedstock from family farmers; (b) enter into 
contracts with family farmers establishing deadlines and conditions of delivery of feedstock; and (c) 
provide technical assistance to the farmers. For the latter requirement, the biodiesel company must 
supply its own technicians or contract specialized services (MDA, 2012).  In the case of Minas Gerais, DRBP 
signed contracts with different institutions for technical assistance, such as the Rural Extension and 
Technical Assistance Company (EMATER), Institute of Labour in Family Farm (ITAF), Pioneira Agricultural 
Cooperative (Cooapi), São Francisco Small Rural Producers Agricultural Cooperative (Coopasf), and Grande 
Sertão Cooperative. Prior to providing technical assistance, these institutions seek out the family farmers, 
organize meetings in which DRBP establishes its objectives, and invite the family farmers to be their 
partners.  
The Brazilian government has chosen castor bean to promote social development in the Brazilian 
northeastern region (Campos and Cornélio, 2009; César and Batalha, 2010). Castor bean cultivation, unlike 
soybean, is mainly based on labor-intensive technologies in plots averaging two hectares. Castor bean is 
used as an alternative feedstock for the biodiesel industry, one that cannot be used for animal or human 
food since it contains the toxic protein ricin (Berman et.al., 2011). Worldwide, castor bean is available at 
low cost and is grown on marginal lands which are typically unsuitable for food crops (Berman et.al, 
2011). Castor bean was identified as the ideal oilseed to be developed under adverse climate and soil 
conditions, such as those found in northern Minas Gerais (IICA, 2007). Moreover, the agricultural zoning§§ 
for this region has been designated for castor bean by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply 
(MAPA).*** All these features make castor bean an attractive alternative biodiesel feedstock. 
DRBP has motivated local family farmers to grow castor bean in order to participate in the biodiesel 
production system. Nevertheless, castor bean production by family farmers in northern Minas Gerais is 
hindered by prior negative experiences. In the 1990s, a processing plant for castor bean was installed in 
Minas Gerais, motivating local family farmers to engage in the activity. Family farmers planted about 
20,000 ha of castor bean, but the processing plant did not fulfill its commitments with the families, 
resulting in substantial economic losses for them (Silva and Perez, 2011).   
According to César and Batalha (2010), in northern Minas Gerais there is a weak culture of collective 
action. In general, there are several problems facing these family farmers, such as geographical 
dispersion; limited access to financial loans; and low adoption of chemical inputs as fertilizers. This 
condition is the result of low education and economic levels, as observed by Silva and Perez (2011). 
Besides the problems facing family farmers, oilseeds that do not have extant structured supply chains, 
such as castor bean, face coordination failures in their different stages of production—agriculture, 
industrialization, and distribution—as noted by Padula et al. (2012). 
The participation of family farmers in the biodiesel AGS is an alternative for social inclusion that is part of 
a public policy of social and environmental sustainability. There are two levels of mechanisms to involve 
family farmers in biodiesel production: 1) informal mechanisms that engage local institutions in 
establishing long-term relationships between the social agents in order to organize local coordination; 2) 
formal mechanisms, which are contracts between family farmers and biodiesel companies, in accordance 
with PNPB. The former is the first approach to involve family farmers, and it is founded on agreements to 
produce castor bean that are based on trust between family farmers and technicians. The latter 
mechanism comes after the agreement, and is based on contracts signed between family farmers and the 
biodiesel company.  
In this study we focused on family farmers organized by EMATER.  The role of EMATER is to foster the 
organization of family farmers and provide them with technical assistance for planting and handling crops. 
Before EMATER starts providing technical assistance to family farmers, a process is followed to approach 
and involve them in the biodiesel program. First, EMATER contacts the association to introduce the 
biodiesel program. Next, EMATER’s technicians visit the family farmers to motivate them to grow castor 
bean. Those family farmers interested in growing this new crop sign a letter of adhesion. Nonetheless, the 
letter of adhesion does not guarantee the participation of family farmers in the biodiesel program. Only 
when the family farmer signs a contract with the biodiesel industry is the participation formalized. The 
contract to supply castor bean to the biodiesel industry is performed with each family farmer individually.  
Every transaction between a family farmer and DRBP is mediated by EMATER. Moreover, family farmers’ 
representatives participate in the agreements between family farmers and biodiesel industry (MDA, 
                                                 
§§ Agricultural zoning is based on agronomic research from the Brazilian Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) that identifies climate risks, 
especially the lack of water during the critical stages of crops, and the best planting dates. Northern Minas Gerais has been identified as an 
agro-climatic zone for castor bean production and technical assistance has been developed for growing this crop. Hence, farmers from 
northern Minas Gerais that cultivate castor bean and follow technical guidance can apply for subsidized credit and participate in the PNPB.  
*** MAPA is the acronym of Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento.  
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2012). In this sense, EMATER has the role participating in the agreements. DRBP offers incentives to family 
farmers based on a contract. The company offers technical assistance (EMATER), defines the price, and 
provides the bags for castor bean storage and transport to the plant.  
The contract signed between DRBP and EMATER stipulates that EMATER technicians will visit each farmer 
four times. The first visit is to encourage the family farmer to join the biodiesel program; the second is to 
supply castor bean seeds to the family farmers; the third is to monitor and evaluate castor bean 
production; and the fourth is to coordinate, harvest, and transport the castor bean production. In 
practice, EMATER’s technicians visit family farmers more than four times, since information exchange and 
crop improvement are constant. Consequently, the trust relationship between family farmers and 










Figure 1. Process for contracting family farmers through rural extension (EMATER) 
Source: Adapted from Watanabe, et. al., 2011  
Initially, DRBP signed a contract with EMATER in 2007 in order to have feedstock from family farmers for 
the start of biodiesel production in 2009, and the goal was to involve 15,130 family farmers in castor bean 
production. However, in 2008–2009, only 8,675 family farmers were interested in participating in the 
biodiesel program and signed the letter of adhesion, and just 4,147 of these actually signed the contract. 
In 2009–2010, the number of family farmers interested in the biodiesel program decreased to 2,800, and 
the number of signed contracts was 2,462. The reason for this decrease was due to mistrust of DRBP. In 
the beginning of the contacts between EMATER’s technicians and family farmers, the provision of fertilizer 
and other soil improvements were offered by DRBP. However, DRBP failed to fulfill these agreements, 
resulting in a decrease of family farmers involved in castor bean cultivation.  
3 Organizing agro-based supply chains: a conceptual model  
The Agro-industrial System (AGS) approach is applied as an analysis tool. Studies based on AGS have been 
done in different production systems, such as coffee (Zylbersztajn and Farina, 2001); wheat (Rossi et.al, 
2005); sugar cane (Neves and Conejero, 2007); and beef (Mondelli and Zylbersztajn, 2008). The present 
study, focused on the production of biodiesel, also employs a systemic view for analysis. The production 
system is a strictly coordinated supply system (Zylbersztajn and Farina 1999) when the degree of asset 
specificity is high; the concept of strictly coordinated supply systems is dependent on cooperation and/or 
hierarchical power. Different agents in biodiesel production systems are connected, and a leading firm 
assumes the coordination role. In our study, we identified DRBP and EMATER as the agents that assume 
the coordination of the supply system, and DRBP monitors EMATER, since the contract is established by 
the former.   
Considering the case of the biodiesel production system in Minas Gerais, DRBP enters into contracts with 
family farmers in order to maintain its “Social Fuel Seal”. The contracts guarantee the purchase of 
feedstock from the family farmers. Despite the fact that the analysis is from a system perspective, the 
selection of agents is related to each transaction of the system. In this study, we focus on transactions 
that involve family farmers who produce castor beans to supply DRBP. The transactions in the complex 
agro-industry system are not necessarily static and linear: for instance, the biodiesel industry can supply 
family farmers with inputs and purchase their production.   
Given that the biodiesel AGS in the state of Minas Gerais is a new process, a complex agro-industrial 
system might arise. Complex forms of governance in the agriculture field involve contracts for vertical and 
horizontal coordination. Lazzarini et al. (2001) introduced the concept of netchain analysis, which studies 
interdependence in networks. “Network” is a general term that encompasses all arrangements involving a 
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set of recurrent contractual ties among autonomous entities (Ménard, 2004). According to Zylbersztajn 
(2000), among the elements required to develop the study of complex agro-industrial systems are:  key 
features of agents involved in the production, the industrial organization of the chain’s sectors, the 
organizational and institutional environments, and the characteristics of the transaction involved in the 
cooperative production efforts. We consider the transaction to be the principal unit for analysis within a 
production system.  
Figure 2 summarizes our theoretical framework, which presents the transactions with castor bean family 
farmers in the biodiesel production system and the institutional and organizational environment. 
 
 
Figure 2. Biodiesel production system 
Source: Adapted from Zylbersztajn (1995) 
 
The efficiency of an economic system depends on how agents conduct their affairs. The agents are 
organized based on the institutional arrangements that govern the process of exchange. The seminal 
article by Ronald Coase (1937), The Nature of the Firm, amplifies the traditional theory of the firm to 
consider contract-based organizations instead of the firm as a production function. Besides the pricing 
mechanism, transaction costs are considered in evaluating different alternative governance modes 
(Williamson, 1996), since economic agents align transactions with governance structures to effect 
economizing outcomes. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) considers the ex-ante costs of negotiation 
efforts, contract design, and safeguarding of agreements, and the ex-post costs of adapting the contract 
to unexpected situations (Williamson 1985).  
The choice of institutional arrangements—market, hierarchy, or hybrid form—depends on economizing 
the transaction costs (Williamson 1991, Williamson 1996). The market form is the arrangement wherein 
autonomous parties exchange products or services without previous planning. The hierarchy form exists 
when transactions are placed under unified ownership and all activities are internalized. The hybrid form 
is a long-term contractual relationship that preserves autonomy but provides added transaction-specific 
safeguards. According to Williamson (1979, 2005), there are three characteristics of transactions that 
affect the choice of institutional arrangement: asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency.   
The main transaction characteristic developed by Williamson was asset specificity, which is related to the 
specific investments involved in a transaction. This transaction characteristic results in a bilaterally tied 
transaction, because specific investment in a transaction creates a dependency relationship. For instance, 
if a specific product requires special equipment for its production, which cannot be easily substituted 
(physical asset specificity), the institutional arrangement will be conducted according to a hybrid or 
hierarchy form. In other words, a specific investment cannot be replaced with another transaction 
without value loss.   
In terms of transaction frequency analysis, there are different frequency levels that influence the trust 
among the transaction participants. If the transaction is more frequent, reputation among the participants 
will increase, in turn constraining opportunistic behavior such as contract breach. The role of transaction 
frequency is related to trust building and reduction of information asymmetry, which can affect the 
agents’ efforts to transact, and enables the design of a less detailed contract; consequently, transaction 
costs decrease.  
The transaction characteristic of uncertainty is related to information asymmetry, demanding greater 
effort from agents in the transaction. The role of uncertainty varies according to the choice of transaction. 
For instance, bilateral contracts fall within the hybrid form, and the adaptation of the transaction requires 
agreement from both parties. In both market and hierarchy organizations, decisions are taken unilaterally. 
Hence, uncertainty is determinant for institutional arrangement choice. Further, the transactions are part 
of an institutional environment, and institutions arise to reduce uncertainty and to facilitate the 
transactions (North 1990, 1991). 
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3.1 Organizational and institutional environments 
Organizational environments involve agents who indirectly participate in the production system and play 
an important role in facilitating the transaction. The institutional environment represents both formal and 
informal institutions. North (1990, 1991) describes institutions as the rules of the game, encompassing 
formal rules (constitutions, laws, and property rights) and informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct). The role of institutions is to control uncertainty and create a 
favorable environment for decision-making. The purpose of North’s analysis (1990) concerns the 
interaction between institutions and agents in the process of choosing organizational structures. 
Institutions are instrumental in the analysis of how organizations are set up, but traditional price theory 
and production functions are not designed to explain institutional arrangements. In order to better 
understand both institutional and organizational environments, we describe them in the following two 
subsections. 
3.1.1 Institutions’ dynamics and connection to institutional arrangement 
Formal and informal institutions form the institutional environment. These institutions provide a set of 
incentives and disincentives for the individual, and arise and evolve because of the interaction of 
individuals (Williamson 1996). For the purposes of this study, the institutions are focused on the biodiesel 
production system in Minas Gerais State. Formal institutions are those regulated by the State, such as the 
Brazilian Biodiesel Program (PNPB), the Social Fuel Seal, and so on. Informal institutions we considered 
include local traditions, family farmers’ beliefs, local rules, and agreements. 
Institutions evolve internally in the context of the local environment with which the individual frequently 
interacts (Ostrom 2008 b). Although the PNPB applies to all of Brazil, it is not followed or even known by 
many family farmers. According to Ostrom (2008b), the rules established by the State are not able to meet 
all personal expectations, so informal rules arise. Moreover, local rules might achieve a higher 
performance rate than systems where the rules are entirely determined by external authorities. 
According to Eggertsson (1990), government regulation induces specialized investments and motivates 
long-term contracts, because they are guaranteed by the state. However, in the absence of government 
regulation, private rules arise in order to guarantee property rights. From another perspective, economic 
rights and legal rights are considered. According to Barzel (2002 p.6) : “[…] economic rights reflect 
individuals’ ability to consume or exchange commodities. These rights may exist in the absence of legal 
rights, though the latter tend to enhance the former. Legal rights are rights delineated by the State. The 
State, as a rule, chooses to enforce the rights it delineates.” Based on the evolution of institutions, 
initially, individuals have no legal rights over the assets they acquire because no legal institutions exist 
(Barzel 2002). Therefore, economic rights can exist in the absence of legal rights.  
The challenge for building the biodiesel AGS in the state of Minas Gerais is to attain efficiency while also 
considering environmental and social issues. Social aspects are relevant for AGS analysis in cases when 
informal institutions explain the observed institutional arrangements. According to Zylbersztajn (2009), 
data collection of contracts only capture a part of the incentives present in most of the institutional 
arrangements, and informal incentives such as agreements should be considered. 
It is important to consider the impact of environment on the formation of an institutional arrangement. 
Biodiesel in Minas Gerais is a new process, and the institutional arrangement is still evolving. The role of 
the social structure can influence either individual or collective behavior and performance. Granovetter 
(1985) uses the term “embeddedness” to explain how social relations affect the behavior of economic 
agents and institutions. In other words, social ties embed individuals, and a network of interpersonal 
relationships is built. The embeddedness argument considers the role of personal identities and the 
structures of the relations that create trust and control opportunism. The concept of environmental 
embeddedness is therefore relevant to the development of new agro-industrial systems, such as the 
biodiesel system. Embeddedness can form strong effects when the relationships last. In such cases, effort 
incentives, trust, and reciprocity play a role.  
3.1.2 The organizational environment 
The organizational environment is composed of agents that indirectly participate in the production 
system. These agents are important for the operation of production, since they facilitate the transactions. 
In this sense, educational and research institutions, financial institutions, and other agents are all part of 
the organizational environment. In terms of biodiesel production, local institutions exist to coordinate 
production, which involves several operations before signing of the contract, such as convincing the family 
farmers, organizing them, supplying technical assistance, providing loans for production, and so on. The 
coordination is structured with the creation of Management Working Groups, and it involves different 
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agents such as the biodiesel companies, representatives of the trade union organizations, technical 
assistance companies, financial organizations, research institutions, cooperatives, and other public or 
private organizations (Abramovay and Magalhães 2007). Based on Poulton et al. (2010), the organizations 
are intermediary institutions that facilitate coordination between small farmers and service providers. 
The reason for creating an organization is due to factors such as minimizing transaction costs, providing 
conflict solutions, reaching the scale of production, and altering the rules of the game in favor of the 
participants (Saes, 2000). Therefore, organizing family farmers means attaining economies of scale and 
reducing transaction costs, which is beneficial for both family farmers and biodiesel companies. By 
working through family farmer’s organizations, biodiesel companies can reduce costs on seeking out the 
farmer’s production and delivering services to them. On the family farmers’ side, they can bargain and 
enforce the agreements with companies through their organization. 
The organizational environment can influence the level of transaction costs (Zylbersztajn, 1995), and must 
be taken into account to understand the choice of different institutional arrangements. For instance, 
transactions between biodiesel companies and family farmers organized into cooperatives are performed 
directly through the cooperative, whereas in cases where the family farmers are instead organized in an 
association, they transact directly with biodiesel company.  
The State Secretariat of Science, Technology and Higher Education (SECTES) is part of the organizational 
environment, since it coordinates the Mineiro Biodiesel Program. Research institutions, such as the 
Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) and the Agricultural Research Corporation of 
Minas Gerais (EPAMIG), are part of the organizational environment as well, because they develop 
research focused on oleaginous plants used for biodiesel production. 
In our study, EMATER is part of the organizational environment because it facilitates the transaction 
between family farmers and DRBP. Prior to providing technical assistance, EMATER seeks out the family 
farmers, organizes meetings in which DRBP establishes their objectives, and invites the family farmers to 
be part of the biodiesel program. In the case of promoting castor bean in the biodiesel program, EMATER 
technicians approach family farmers through local associations. These associations are part of the 
organization environment as well, providing family farmers with opportunities to participate in different 
development programs, such as the biodiesel program (PNPB).  
The organizational environment consists of several agents that support family farmers in their production 
and transaction activities. Besides the agents described above, others that are part of this environment 
include financial institutions, farmer unions, bargaining associations, and marketing cooperatives. The 
organizational environment affects both production and transaction conditions, and therefore affects the 
choice of institutional arrangements. 
The organizational and institutional environments play an important role in the selection of institutional 
arrangements to minimize transaction costs. In this study we used TCE for a static model analysis through 
the data collection over a certain period. However, in order to explore the dynamic perspective to 
understand how the biodiesel production system in Minas Gerais might evolve, other perspectives of 
analysis could be applied, such as the evolutionary perspective that arose with the studies of Penrose 
(1959), and property rights (Demsetz, 1967; Barzel, 1994, 1997). The Resource-Based View (RBV) theory 
that is related to the analysis of potential value creation can be adopted as well. Foss and Foss (2005) 
examined the relationship between RBV and transaction costs. Fowler and Zylbersztajn (2012) explored 
the relationship between property rights and RBV.  
4 Methodology  
The case study method has been chosen for the analysis, adopting the agro-industrial system (AGS) 
approach. The purpose of the case study method is theoretical generalization rather than statistical 
generalization, and it is well accepted in social sciences (Yin, 1989; De Vaus, 2001).  A qualitative and 
exploratory study was carried out to analyze the complex institutional arrangements within the formation 
of a biodiesel production system involving family farmers in Minas Gerais.  
Direct observations were made during the years 2009 and 2010 in northern Minas Gerais (figure 3). The 
period of our visits was the start of biodiesel production in the municipality of Montes Claros, since 
PETROBRAS, an open capital company controlled by the Brazilian Government, opened a new processing 
facility, the Darcy Ribeiro Biodiesel Plant (DRBP), in 2009. PETROBRAS selected Montes Claros because it is 
the main urban center of northern Minas Gerais. Moreover, Minas Gerais is home to a large number of 
family farmers, particularly in the north of the state.  




Figure 3. Map of Minas Gerais and research areas 
 
The first visit to Minas Gerais was in July of 2009, to obtain an overview of the biodiesel production 
system and to contact the stakeholders involved. This visit focused on the identification of the main 
agents involved in biodiesel production in Minas Gerais and the understanding of how they had been 
organized to implement the biodiesel program. The second visit was in November of 2009, to Darcy 
Ribeiro Biodiesel Plant (DRBP) in Montes Claros, to obtain information about the castor bean-producing 
family farmers and learn about the transactions between them and the DRBP. The last visit took place in 
April of 2010 in three municipalities: Montes Claros, Coração de Jesus, and Claro dos Poções.  
Direct personal interviews using three different semi-structured questionnaires were applied respectively 
to three groups: family farmers, biodiesel industry representative from DRBP, and transaction facilitators 
(EMATER technicians). In total, 38 stakeholders were interviewed: 29 family farmers, 1 DRBP 
representative, and 8 transaction facilitators. Due to the difficulties accessing the family farmers, the 
EMATER technicians facilitated the approach to every family farmer that answered the questionnaire. The 
visit to these three municipalities provided information about the castor bean family farmers assisted by 
EMATER. In addition to visiting family farmers, visits were made to both DRBP and the EMATER office 
located in Montes Claros.  
The interviews were organized in order to identify the agents and the detail about the transactions each 
performs to implement the biodiesel program in Minas Gerais. Moreover, we focused on the information 
about family farmers supplying DRBP. For this paper, we considered those family farmers organized by 
EMATER. The main criterion for selecting a case study focused on castor bean farmers was because the 
Brazilian government has chosen this crop to promote social development in the northern and semi-arid 
regions of the country, such as northern Minas Gerais (Campos and Cornélio, 2009; César and Batalha, 
2010).  
The choice of EMATER is justified since this institution plays a key role in the governmental strategy and 
reaches a wide number of family farmers in northern Minas Gerais to organize them to produce castor 
bean. EMATER Minas Gerais was created in 1975 to work both actively and in operational planning, 
especially in developing outreach programs for family farmers. Its technicians are trained to exchange 
information for improving family farmers’ conditions and production quality. Moreover, EMATER includes 
family farmers that are part of an association in programs that generate employment and income.  
During the visits to Minas Gerais we used direct observations to understand the production and 
transaction system, and collected secondary data in interviews. Through the information obtained during 
these visits, we present a description of castor bean family farmers that supply DRBP, and analysis of the 
start-up phase of the complex agro-based systems based on our theoretical framework.  
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5 Transactions of biodiesel AGS using castor bean in Minas Gerais 
Based on the interviews given to the agents involved in the biodiesel production system in Minas Gerais, 
the following statements were observed. The social ties in the biodiesel system in Minas Gerais are weak 
since it is a new system, still being formed. The agents do not always have previous social relations; 
hence, mutual reputation and trust are in a process of construction. Although there exists a national 
biodiesel program determined from top to bottom, local institutions must be taken into account in 
constructing it. Hence, family farmers do not immediately adopt written contracts to introduce a new oil 
crop. Rather, an agreement is first made between the family farmers and EMATER technicians, and then 
the contract between family farmer and DRBP is signed. The agreement is mainly based on trust that 
family farmers place in EMATER technicians. 
Although the family farmers coordinated by EMATER are collectively organized in an association, they do 
not show a strong collective organization as we have observed in some Brazilian cooperatives, such as 
Cooapi and Coopasf. This association has different purposes than cooperatives and its regulation is 
different. The former is an organization whose purpose is to promote social, educational, or cultural 
assistance, whereas the latter have has economic purpose. These differences determine the way in which 
family farmers transact with DRBP. In terms of family farmers collectively organized into cooperatives, a 
single transaction would involve a large number of family farmers. Unlike family farmers affiliated with 
cooperative, the castor bean family farmers transact with DRBP individually.  
We analyzed the transactions between castor bean family farmers and DRBP, according to the elements 
proposed in the theory. The following transaction characteristics (Williamson, 1979, 2005), such as asset 
specificity, were observed:  
1) DRBP must transact with family farmers. Therefore, the industry provides some incentives, such as 
technical assistance, purchase guarantees, free bags for holding the crop, and transportation support 
(minimum of 2,000 kg).  
2) For castor bean producing family farmers, DRBP represents an exclusive market. Furthermore, the 
castor bean is considered toxic and it cannot be used to feed animals or human beings. Therefore, 
family farmers are tied to DRBP and more exposed to opportunistic behavior on the part of the buyer.  
Every transaction between a family farmer and DRBP is intermediated by EMATER and, in terms of transaction 
frequency, the following aspects were observed: 
1) DRBP and EMATER entered into a formal contract, under which technicians must visit each family 
farmer four times. However, EMATER’s technicians visit family farmers more than four times for 
information exchange and crop improvement. Because the trust relationship between family farmers 
and EMATER technicians is already established, a number of family farmers cultivate castor bean and 
continue doing so.  
2) The frequency of transactions between family farmers and DRBP is not constant, since EMATER 
intermediates these transactions. The relationship and trust between family farmers and DRBP is still 
under construction. Family farmers do not trust DRBP because DRBP has breached some agreements, 
such as that for the provision of fertilizer and other soil improvements. There is no law that requires 
these incentives for family farmers and DRBP only made agreements with family farmers, without 
signing any contract. Even though there is no contract, there were verbal agreements that have not 
been fulfilled, what makes it difficult for EMATER to convince family farmers to cultivate castor bean.  
In terms of uncertainty in the transactions between family farmers assisted by EMATER and DRBP, we observed 
the following: 
1) As DRBP initially did not fulfill the agreements, EMATER has difficulty for convincing the family farmers 
to produce castor bean. 
2) On the other hand, some family farmers also fail to fulfill the agreement for cultivating castor bean. 
Initially, a number of family farmers were motivated to cultivate castor bean and signed the letter of 
adhesion. However, because DRBP did not fulfill the agreement to supply fertilizer and provide other 
soil improvements, some family farmers breached the agreement and did not sign the contract. In 
these cases, the family farmers receive a private punishment, since they are excluded from supplying 
the DRBP the next time. 
Firstly, the relationship between family farm and biodiesel industry resulted in agreements based on 
informal institutions. These agreements are related to letters of adhesion and verbal agreements for 
providing certain inputs, which are not required by law. As the relationship between family farmers and 
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DRBP is under construction, reputation is low and agreements can be breached. Insofar as social relations 
are established between family farmer and biodiesel industry, the former accepts to produce a new oil 
crop and the written contract is performed. The reason for this is the fact that the social relationship 
provides reputation and, consequently, the decrease in transaction costs to perform a written contract. 
Moreover, the agreements enforced by informal institutions (social norms) are replaced by the contract, 
which is enforced by law (Eggertsson, 1990; Barzel, 2002).  
The process whereby EMATER approaches the family farmer is developed through four steps. We 
observed that the first and second steps are part of building the social relationship, related to the concept 
of embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985). The first step is when EMATER contacts the farmers’ association to 
introduce the biodiesel program, and the second is when EMATER’s technicians visit family farmers to 
convince them to grow a new crop. The third step describes the situation wherein property rights are not 
perfectly protected and the formal institutions are weak; consequently, informal institutions prevail. 
Informal rules play a relevant role in convincing family farmers to grow oleaginous plants, and agreements 
are undertaken. The fourth step is when the family farmer signs the written contract with the DRBP. At 
this stage, the transaction is based on formal institutions. 
Because the Social Fuel Seal program stipulates that the biodiesel industry must purchase feedstock from 
family farmers and provide technical assistance, free storage bags for castor beans, and transportation 
support, the transaction is organized in hybrid form. Hence, the relationship between family farmers and 
DRBP is first based on informal institutions or economic rights (Barzel, 2002), and organized in hybrid 
form—agreements. As trust increases, a contract is signed by the family farmer to provide castor bean to 
DRBP, and the transaction is organized in hybrid form—contract (figure 4).  
  
 
Figure 4. Institutional environment and hybrid forms. 
6 Conclusion 
Castor bean cultivation is mainly done by hand and in small areas of, on average, two hectares. Moreover, 
this crop is appropriate for adverse climate and soil conditions, such as found in northern Minas Gerais. 
However, the weak relationship between family farmers and the biodiesel industry might affect the 
decision to engage in the production of castor bean. A family farmer’s decision to cultivate castor bean is 
not immediate. Negative experience with castor bean cultivation in the past was observed to have a 
negative influence on family farmers’ decisions about cultivating the crop again. Other hindrances to the 
introduction of castor bean are related to soil conditions, weather conditions, and local culture. In terms 
of culture, most family farmers in northern Minas Gerais raise cattle and believe castor beans are 
poisonous for their livestock.  
On the part of the biodiesel industry, more efforts are necessary to convince small farmers to produce a 
new crop for the biodiesel production system. These efforts mean costs in the form of incentives for small 
farmers, such as technical assistance, donation of seeds, and a guarantee of acquiring the production. 
Considerable effort from EMATER technicians is required to convince family farmers to grow this crop. 
The key measure for implementation of PNPB in Minas Gerais is to organize the family farmers. The castor 
bean producers who supply DRBP do not have a tradition of collaborating in collective action. Several 
family farmers are resistant to the biodiesel program, and the reputation of the biodiesel industry is still 
nascent. On the other side, the biodiesel industry is in the process of learning how to work with small 
farmers, and it is necessary for it to understand local culture. In this sense, the informal mechanism to 
involve family farmers is employed, while the formal mechanism might not have reached a level sufficient 
to support the production.  
Kassia Watanabe and Decio Zylbersztajn/ Int. J. Food System Dynamics 3 (2), 2012, 185-198 
 
196 
Some family farmers had negative experiences, such as difficulty in accessing seeds; delays in production 
collecting and payment; and difficulty in accessing subsidized loans. These all influenced the decision of 
some family farmers to discontinue their engagement in the program. The reason for the delays is the lack 
of family farmers’ organization and consequently the presence of information asymmetry among the 
agents. No horizontal spontaneous forms of organizations, such as cooperatives, have been observed in 
the areas where they are most needed.  
The difficulty in accessing funding loans from financial institutions is due to the large probability of 
contract breaches by family farmers that do not have social ties with banks or public agents of industries. 
In general, these family farmers have not fulfilled their promises and cannot access funding loans. The 
lack of organization of family farmers results in difficulties coordinating the biodiesel AGS. The family 
farmers are spread over a large region, and consequently it is difficult to offer technical assistance and 
collect their production. Moreover, family farmers do not have power in negotiations with biodiesel 
industries. For this reason, collective action would be important for future price negotiations and better 
conditions to participate in the biodiesel AGS.  
Based on the analysis of the introduction of the PNPB to Minas Gerais, intensive work with family farmers 
is necessary to develop a network of suppliers to the biodiesel industry. The technicians who are to seek 
out and have contact with family farmers should know the local institutions. For family farmers to be 
involved in the biodiesel AGS, it is necessary for them to be organized, which might be possible through 
collective action. This introductory study also suggests that the PNPB has yet to reach its maturity, being 
faced with several obstacles.  
Considering that in order for the DRBP to participate in the Social Fuel Seal Program it must purchase 
feedstock from family farmers, the institutional arrangement cannot be a vertical integration. Because the 
DRBP must provide family farmers with technical assistance, free bags to store castor beans, and 
transportation support, the institutional arrangement is a hybrid form. Firstly, the relationship between 
family farmers and DRBP is based on informal institutions or economic rights through agreements. As 
trust increases, a contract is signed by family farmers to provide castor bean to DRBP. This is made 
possible by the act of building the castor bean supply chain, through which relationships have been 
established to seek a long-term partnership to meet biodiesel program expectations.  
This study represents only a first attempt to explore a static perspective, using as a theoretical 
underpinning Transaction Cost Economics to analyze data collected in a set period.  Future studies from a 
dynamic perspective might be interesting, employing different theoretical perspectives for analysis. 
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